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Insiders might have incentives and objectives opposed to those of the belonging organization. It is hard to
detect them because of their privileges that partially protect them. In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs),
significant security issues arise, including compromised nodes by insiders that disrupt the normal network
operation. Immediate defensive actions to isolate malicious nodes would mitigate any related impacts.
A multiplayer game model is proposed as a solution to the problem of insider attacks in WSNs, the
Game of Wireless Sensor Networks (GoWiSeN). It is an imperfect information game, formulated with
the use of non-cooperative game theory, holding the assumption that all players are rational. The model
consists of several Local Intrusion Detection Systems (LIDSs), which are located to different nodes and
communicate with a Global Intrusion Detection System (GIDS). Each LIDS gives suggestions whether
the monitoring node is trusted or not. The game is being played between a potential attacker, the nodes
and the GIDS. The GIDS is responsible to make a final decision and isolate a compromised node in case
of an internal attack. The theoretical model represents these interactions in an extensive form game. The
formal elements of the game are specified, the outcomes of the game are quantified by first specifying
players’ preferences, and then, by using the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and payoffs are
obtained. The game is constructed and solved, by locating NE in pure and mixed strategies. Experimental
evaluations conducted on real network datasets, using IDSs of different capabilities, simulate special





















Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) were introduced some years ago as a new technology that combines34
wireless communication (7) , computation, and sensing (59). The great range of applications has made35
WSNs very popular and the need for simple and familiar interactions more essential than ever. As36
part of pervasive computing environments, WSNs raise fundamental security issues. Attacks on sensor37
networks routing (novel attacks - sinkhole and HELLO floods) have imposed new design for secure routing38
protocols(33). Detection of masquerade attacks on WSNs requires lightweight techniques with respect39
to important WSN properties, like coverage, connectivity, data aggregation and specific communication40
patterns (12). Such characteristics have generated special attacking methods to WSNs, as the sleep41
deprivation attack (50), the time synchronization attack (41), and the selective forwarding attack (66).42
Several taxonomies of attacks on WSNs has been proposed in (28; 46).43
Intrusion Detection plays an active role in cybersecurity and many different technologies, tools, and44
approaches have been used in conjunction with it, as blockchain technology (5), machine learning (21),45
and fuzzy logic (23). As an important area of research, Intrusion detection has been applied in WSNs46
to enhance their security, despite the fact that it is used as a second line of defense. Classical detection47
techniques have been employed over lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), like the anomaly48
intrusion detection technique in (11), to detect and deter attacks that affect the normal and uninterruptible49
operation of WSNs.50
One of the main security problems in WSNs is the problem of compromised nodes, as defined in (67).51
Although cryptographic mechanisms are used to protect sensor networks from masquerading attacks,52
attackers might compromise a node by stealing a key, and introducing afterwards faulty data from this53
compromised node. There are two approaches to address this problem; either distinguish faulty data54
from real data, or detect which node is the compromised node and exclude it from the network. The first55
approach has been mainly employed by other related works, but without significant results. Authors in56
(4) introduced the concept of evolutionary game using a group policy/authentication method to resist57
intelligent attacks which do not use pure strategies.58
Since a great number of attacks against sensor network routing originated by outsiders can be evaded59
by the use of authentication and encryption mechanisms (33), insider attacks are the most challenging and60
demanding to be counteracted. The proposed work addresses the problem of detecting insider attacks61
in WSNs, by taking the advantages of intrusion detection when incorporating findings of game theory.62
The current manuscript is an extended version of the previously published article in (32). Compared63
to the previous publication, it incorporates evaluation results of the IDSs under a realistic Internet of64
Things (IoT) dataset, which affect the players’ payoffs, analyses specific cases where nodes belong to65
more than one clusters, and discusses the situation where a Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) is66
compromised.67
In this paper, a game model between a potential attacker, and the IDSs used in a WSN is proposed. The68
potential attacker is an internal user of the system, who acts normally most of the times, but occasionally69
attacks the system, by compromising a node of the WSN.70
Following Osbornes and Rubinsteins dimensions (49), the player, the plan of actions, and the71
information, upon which three divisions of game theoretic models are based, a non-cooperative game72
theoretic model is constructed, in extensive form that allows each player to think about his plan of actions73
whenever he plays, formulating the sequential moves of interactions, with imperfect information.74
The under construction game is named GoWiSeN as an abbreviation of ’Game of Wireless Sensor75
Networks’. According to prescriptive game theory, theoretical examination of the constructed game,76
allows us to determine how players should play it, and to recommend strategies. As a result, it is possible77
to give advice that helps players to make better decisions.78
The main contributions of the article are summarized in the following:79
• A three player non-cooperative game is modeled, to study the interactions between an insider and80
the IDSs used in a WSN (Section The Game).81
• The solution of the game by locating Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies is provided (Section82
Solution of the Game).83
• Evaluation of the model is conducted using a dataset from realistic network environment that84
includes normal and botnet traffic (Section Experimental Evaluations).85
• Discussion on special cases of nodes that belong to overlapping clusters is given (Section Special86
Cases).87
• The situation where a LIDS is compromised is examined (Section Special Cases).88
The paper has been organized in nine sections. In Section Related Work, review related works and89
discussion against the proposed work is provided. The architecture of the proposed model is illustrated90
in Section The Architecture of the Model. The game that models the interactions between the different91
parties of this architecture is constructed and solved in Sections The Game and Solution of the Game. A92
complete case study is presented in Section A Case Study and two different scenarios are described to93
explain the implementation and functioning of the game model. In Section Experimental Evaluations94
simulated results on a realistic dataset are presented. In Section Special Cases two special cases are95
discussed with regards to how they can be modeled and analyzed. Finally, in Section Conclusion and96




The problem of detecting attackers in WSNs has been addressed by various approaches. The ultimate aim100
is the discrimination between compromised nodes and normal ones. A malicious node should be isolated101
as soon as identified, because it has no trust value and prohibits the normal network operation. Among the102
large number of constraints inherited in WSNs, the most important are; the low computational capability,103
and the limited recourses regarding memory and energy. In addition to these, security issues enhance, in104
many ways, their vulnerabilities and make them easy targets.105
A number of detection engines proposed as a solution to this problem are presented in (56), through106
the discussion of their corresponding research works that incorporate different tools, technologies and107
methods. Probabilistic models, game theoretic approaches, K-means clustering, artificial immune systems,108
distributed anomaly detection techniques, genetic algorithms and Random Neural Networks (RNN) are109
a sample of these solution approaches. The authors give valuable conclusions for the importance of110
detection in WSNs and the possible architectures that might be incorporated in constructing dedicated111
IDSs for these type of networks.112
Game Theory acts as a set of tools to model interactive situations. Camerer describes it as the answers113
to mathematical questions regarding what players with ranging rationality will do in the future (15). Game114
theoretic approaches consequently have gained favor in many research works the last few years (44),115
many related to cybersecurity and specifically to intrusion detection. Kiennert et. al. have investigated116
different solutions that might improve the efficiency of intrusion detection systems with the use of game117
theory (34).118
Another survey on game theoretic approaches used in WSNs concentrates on three main problems;119
sensor’s energy efficiency, network security, and pursuit-evasion games (38). The majority of the works120
described tackle the sensor’s energy efficiency problem, though network security and pursuit-evasion121
games are very significant too. Examining the problem of security, two types of threats are mentioned, the122
external attacker, and the malicious nodes within the sensor network. Another interesting survey on game123
theoretic approaches for WSNs can be found in (57).124
The problem of compromised nodes has been addressed by Zhang et. al. in (67). They propose an125
application-independent framework for identifying compromised sensor nodes, and they develop alert126
reasoning algorithms for this identification. Their technical approach uses an observer model.127
LIDSs have been defined in an adapted architecture for an intrusion detection system for manets in (6).128
In another work (37), Ma et. al. take advantages of LIDSs to have a tradeoff among the security of WSN129
and communication overhead.130
To address security problems mentioned above, Subba et. al. propose in (60), a game theoretic multi131
layered intrusion detection framework for WSNs. The proposed framework uses specification rules and a132
lightweight anomaly detection module to identify malicious sensor nodes. The framework models the133
interactions between the IDS and a node as a two player non-cooperative Bayesian game, which guides the134
IDS how to choose proper strategies based on the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. The game is supported by135
two mechanisms that strengthen cooperation, the Shapley Value and the Vickery–Clark–Grooves (VCG)136
mechanism.137
Han et. al. propose in (27) a game theoretic solution approach to solve two problems in WSNs;138
the limited resources and the efficiency in detecting malicious nodes. A non-cooperative, complete-139
information, static game model is constructed and solved using the Nash equilibrium approach, to isolate140
the optimal defense strategies that balances the system’s detection efficiency and energy consumption. In141
addition, an autoregressive model is built as a prediction model to locate the attacker’s target node.142
In (61), Wang et. al. focus on the area of Intrusion Detection to solve security problems in Cyber-143
Physical Embedded Systems (CPESs), admitting that existing security mechanisms cannot directly be144
applied to Embedded Sensor Networks (ESNs). They propose a new attack-defense game model to145
detect malicious nodes and choose to play the game repeatedly. The IDS takes into consideration two146
important parameters; error detection and missing detection. The proposed model achieves to reduce147
energy consumption and increase the detection rate, and thus enhance ESNs security using this active148
defense approach.149
The problem of IoT heterogeneous devices connected to untrusted networks is discussed in (54).150
The authors expose the advantages gained by the combination of the anomaly and the misuse detection151
techniques in a single detection engine, which reduces the high false positive and false negative alarms152
respectively. But, this simultaneous activation in low-resource IoT devices could generate a high-energy153
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consumption. To overcome this drawback, Sedjelmaci et. al. propose a game theoretic approach that154
activates anomaly detection technique only when a new attack’s signature become evident. The anomaly155
detection technique models the normal behavior of a node through a learning algorithm, and when a new156
attack pattern appears, it models it following a set of rules. Moreover, a reputation model based on game157
theory supplements the aim of reducing false rates.158
Bai et. al. in (9) construct a game to model the attack and defense interactions between nodes and159
an IDS in WSNs. The aim is to determine the optimal defensive strategies an IDS should select in160
order to reduce energy consumption and improve detection efficiency. The scalability of the system is161
another problem addressed by the incorporation of the Agent technology, which also leads to system fault162
tolerance enhancement.163
The incorporation of trust management models in WSNs as an alternative security mechanism has164
been suggested in different research works (26). They aim at detecting malicious attacks, secure routing,165
secure data aggregation, secure localization, or secure node selection. The common point in most of them166
is trust. Some research works that employ a trust model to detect malicious nodes in WSNs are discussed167
in the next paragraphs.168
Wu et. al. start by pointing out two WSN features, the openness feature imposed by the wireless169
connectivity and the inherent self-organization feature in WSNs, and both reveal a significant concern170
regarding the trust evaluation of network nodes. By accepting the difficulty in recognizing a nodes171
behavior and making a decision over it, they propose a new trust model based on fuzzy theory and revised172
evidence theory, to detect nodes that have anomaly behavior. It is a trust-based anomaly detection model173
that aims at verifying the normal operation of the network by identifying malicious nodes in it (63).174
A hybrid IDS for WSNs that combines the anomaly and the misuse detection technique is presented175
in (58). The proposed system is based on fuzzy rule sets along with the Multilayer Perceptron Neural176
Network and addresses three types of attacks, the Sybil attack, the wormhole attack, and the hello flood177
attack, by adopting specific algorithms for each of them. Experimental results show the effectiveness178
of the presented IDS in detecting malicious nodes in a WSN, with high true positive rate and low false179
positive rate.180
A trust evaluation model based on an entropy weight assignment method is proposed in (64) for the181
detection of malicious nodes in WSNs. The work addresses attack types related to packet dropping or182
packet modification by incorporating trust indicators and estimates trust values that reflect adjacent nodes183
behavioral information. The use of an entropy weight method improves the evaluation procedure and the184
trust concluding results, which lead to the detection of malicious nodes.185
Another method to detect insiders in WSN is a trust-based mechanism presented in (43). A Bayesian186
model is deployed in a detection mechanism to isolate malicious nodes and permit the benign ones to187
continue the normal network operation. This trust model allows the establishment of trust values in an188
hierarchical structure, which reduces the network traffic and facilitates detection. The authors conclude189
that the proposed method shows experimentally that a Bayesian trust model is a suitable solution for the190
detection of malicious nodes in WSNs comparing to their corresponding work in wired networks.191
An alternative approach to build a detection model, adequate for WSN, with a novel nonparametric192
Bayesian method is proposed in (8). This method works with no need to specify parameters such as the193
number of clusters to detect both known and unknown attacks. A Bayesian-based MCMC inference for194
infinite bounded generalized Gaussian mixture models is used to learn the event patterns. Experimental195
evaluation results show the efficiency of the proposed method to detect a few types of attacks.196
Another trust model based on clustering is proposed in (31). A weighted trust method is examined in197
a WSN that consists of a base station, a number of sensor nodes divided into some clusters, a node of each198
cluster selected to be the head of it, and a forward node that transmits aggregated data to the base station.199
The method aims at malicious node detection. Different scenarios regarding the clustering structure show200
that the detection time is less, the accuracy and the scalability are better, and the propagation time is less,201
when clustering includes multiple cluster heads with non-overlapping grid comparing to single cluster202
head without grid.203
A detailed comparison of different trust models and the proposed GoWiSeN with respect to 1) method,204
2) objective, 3) strengths, and 4) weaknesses is provided in Table 1.205
The proposed work focuses on the special case of internal attackers, and formulates a game model with206
three players, one assumed as a potential attacker (insider), an IDS monitoring a node of a WSN, named207
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Table 1. Comparison of trust models 5/24
many LIDSs, named Global Intrusion Detection System (GIDS). The games played are between different209
LIDSs, the GIDS and an insider, as imposed by the model architecture in multiplayer game constructions.210
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only game-theoretic approach for intrusion detection in WSNs211
that constructs and solves multiplayer games for insiders.212
Prior work has shown that, in the special case of insiders, Intrusion Detection can efficiently be213
employed in a game theoretic framework, to address significant security problems in WSNs (32). Several214
other recent works study and take into account these preliminary results ((36), (51), (53)), and employ215
similar conceptual approaches. Li et. al. in (36) recently designed an intrusion sensitivity-based trust216
management model for WSNs to defend against insider attacks. In their proposed work, each IDS217
evaluates the trustworthiness of others and automatically assigns the values of intrusion sensitivity with218
the use of machine learning techniques. The cooperation between different IDSs resembles the combined219
working of LIDSs and the GIDS, which was proposed in (32). Ranaweera et. al. in (51) also give an220
extension by applying traffic flow theory in order to identify anomalous data in vehicular networks, and221
provide reliable and consistent predictions against incorrect decisions. Finally, in (53), a game theoretic222
model for intrusion detection in WI-FI networks is presented.223
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MODEL224
We have assumed a WSN with a large number of nodes, densely scattered in an area. This network225
consists of a set C of n clusters, C = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn}. Each cluster covers a number of nodes, quantified226
as mi for the ith cluster, that communicate one another and each with a base station. Thus, the set of227
nodes for the ith cluster is Ni = {Ni1,Ni2, . . . ,Nim}. Although the problem of positioning base stations in a228
sensor network is already under consideration (14), we have chosen the use of a single base station, for229
simplicity reasons.230
In this network, there is a Global IDS, the GIDS, established on a separate machine, at the base station.231
This GIDS receives signs of suspicious or trusting activities from the total number of Local IDSs (LIDSs),232
E, as calculated in (1), each one installed on a node of the network. The set of the mi LIDSs included in233






The notation adopted in this paper is summarized in Table 2.235
Notations
C set of n clusters
Ci the ith cluster
mi the number of nodes in the ith cluster
Ni the set of nodes for the ith cluster
Nim the mth node of the ith cluster
E the total number of LIDSs in a WSN
Li the total number of mi LIDSs in the ith cluster
Lim the mth LIDS in the ith cluster
Table 2. Notation used in this paper
A LIDS is a light version of a classical IDS adopted to run on a node of a sensor network. Its efficiency236
is absolutely affected and limited by the local memory, the battery power and all related characteristics237
inherent in a node of a sensor network. All these constraints prevent the direct employment of ordinary238
operating systems and applications on sensor nodes (62). Therefore, alternative OSs have been developed239
to support the special requirements of these devices, like the most common open source TinyOS (29),240
created at UC Berkeley. Likewise, special software design patterns have been introduced to be employed in241
the TinyOS (24). Moreover, specific applications implemented for WSNs use the C standard programming242
language. Such a decision has been implied as this is the actual language used for embedded systems that243
work under constraints in memory and power, and limited computational capabilities (62).244
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Figure 1. The architecture of the model.
Figure 1 depicts a network of this architecture, with a sensor field of five clusters, and a ranging245
number of nodes included in each of them. Every node of a cluster communicates with all others in the246
same cluster and connects with the base station. The GIDS has been installed on the base station and247
twenty four LIDSs have been set up to work on the corresponding nodes.248
THE GAME249
Suppose a user is using the sensor network from a node of a cluster. He is a legitimate user and he has250
specific rights granted from the system, in accordance with its security policy. But the user is a potential251
attacker, who is acting normally and intrusively, depending on what goals he wants to achieve. When he252
is acting normally, the node looks as if it were a regular node of the network, misleading that it works253
properly.254
Consider a case where this user requests resources from the network, breaching the security policy of255
the system. In other words, the user tries to get from the system resources but he has no right to do so.256
There are two possible reasons that this might happen; either the user has the right to get this resource but257
his request exceeds some specified limits, or the user tries to get resources but he is not authorized. In258
both situations, the user exploits the fact that he is a user of the system, and as so, he has some rights to259
use it. So, he is authorized for certain actions. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is a challenging260
task to draw a line that separates the user between normal and attacker.261
A game with three players is constructed to model what described in Section The Architecture of the262
Model. The number of players has been decided and imposed by the architecture of the model (Figure 1).263
In an extended version of the proposed game there might be four players or more that could trigger264
distributed attacks against a WSN. But in non-cooperative Game Theory, the more players play the game265
the more difficult it is to solve ((16), (18), and (52)). Daskalakis and Papadimitriou prove in (19) that266
computing a Nash equilibrium in a three player game is a problem that belongs in the PPAD-complete267
class, a class defined to address the problem of finding a NE in polynomial time. Furthermore, they prove268
in (17) that finding a Nash equilibrium in a 4-player game is also PPAD-complete.269
In order to define the game, the following formal elements should be specified:270
• The list of players. There are three players, the Potential Attacker (PA), the Local Intrusion271
Detection System (LIDS), and the Global Intrusion Detection System (GIDS).272
• Their possible actions. PA’s strategy set includes two action types, the normal action type, and the273
attacking action type. LIDS’s actions are two, the suggestion for suspicious and the suggestion for274
trusting. The GIDS’s actions are also two, the exclude action and the admit action.275
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• What the players know when they act. When the game starts, no player has enough information,276
and thus they act under great uncertainty. PA might know that LIDSs and a GIDS monitor the277
WSN. The LIDSs and the GIDS keep history traces on how the game is being played, valuable278
information for next rounds.279
• The outcomes of the players actions. The total number of the possible outcomes of the game is280
eight, which derives from all possible combinations between the three players’ actions (2∗2∗2).281
• The players preferences over these outcomes. To quantify the outcomes of the game, first there is282
a need to specify preferences over outcomes. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is283
used. A player prefers a strategy over another, because he gains more or he loses less. Following284
Binmores method (13), numbers are assigned to reflect these preferences, and all players utility285
functions are constructed. Next, 0 is set to the least preferred strategy and 1 to the most preferred286
strategy. Using rational numbers, a value is assigned to every strategy, according to corresponding287
rankings. Then, the values free of fractions are obtained, after multiplying with their least common288
factor. The results are the payoffs of the game.289
The first player is a user of the system who is a Potential Attacker (PA) under certain circumstances,290
namely a node of the sensor network. It is assumed that the PA is anyone excpet the system administrator,291
because in this situation, the user could be fully authorized and no distinction can be easily made between292
normal action and attacking activity. The second player is the Local IDS (LIDS), hosted by the node293
responsible for making suggestions for suspicious or trusting activities, triggered by the PA. Finally, the294
third player is the Global IDS (GIDS) that resides in the base station of the network, takes into account295
the LIDS suggestions, examines the history of the corresponding nodes activities, and decides whether to296
exclude or to admit what the user has requested.297
Summarizing, player PA has the two strategies normal action and attacking action, player LIDS has298
the two strategies suggestion for trusting and suggestion for suspicious, and player GIDS has the two299
strategies admit and exclude a user’s action as normal or intrusive respectively.300
There are two main forms for the construction of a game that represents a problem; the normal and the301
extensive forms. In the normal form games players act simultaneously, whereas in extensive form games302
players act sequentially, the one after the other. We have chosen the extensive form for the construction of303
the proposed game model to represent appropriately the interactions that take place between an internal304
attacker, a LIDS and the GIDS (48).305
Figure 2 represents the extensive form of the GoWiSeN. Extensive form games are portrayed by trees.306
Player PA moves first at the initial node (the root) of the game, denoted by a red circle. The player’s name307
is displayed above the node. Below the node, the default labeling is the information set’s number. It is a308
unique identifier of the information set, in the form player number:information set number (e.g. 1:1 means309
the first move of the first player, i.e. the first move of player PA). Von Neumann defined information sets310
to model the progressive learning of which decisions will actually be made (13).311
Similarly, player LIDS’s moves start at blue circles, above which LIDS is written, and below, a312
corresponding pair, labeling its information set’s number (2:1 means that the second player, player LIDS,313
moves for the first time).314
It is assumed that players LIDS and GIDS are not totally certain that player PA has chosen one of the315
actions included in his action set. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is no detection engine316
with 100% detection rate. Thus, player LIDS’s (or GIDS’s) sub-trees belong to the same information set,317
connected with a dotted line to indicate this. In short, the dotted line connects player LIDS’s (or GIDS’s)318
nodes to indicate the Local or the Global IDS accuracy respectively, and thus, the degree of uncertainty319
whether player LIDS (or GIDS) has chosen a (suggestion for suspicious) or (suggestion for trusting) action320
(or an (Exclude) or (Admit) action).321
Looking at the ends of the branches, 8 outcomes are identified. The number of outcomes derives322
from all the possible combinations between the PA’s actions and the Local and Global IDSs’ actions (23).323
There are three capital letters at the end of the upper branch of the tree only and above the node as an324
example, that denotes player PA’s, player LIDS’s, and player GIDS’s choices, respectively. Specifically,325
(ASE) means that player PA has chosen an (attacking) action, player LIDS followed with a suggestion for326
suspicious action, and player GIDS chose afterwards to Exclude PA’s action.327
Finally, the tuple of three numbers next to each end node is the players’ payoffs, that is to say, the328
outcome a player receives when a certain action has been chosen, represented as a number. The outcomes329
of the game are quantified, by first specifying preferences over outcomes, and then by using the von330
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Figure 2. GoWiSeN in an extensive form game.
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (13). The red number belongs to player PA, the blue number331
belongs to player LIDS, and the green number belongs to player GIDS.332
The players play the game repeatedly an infinite number of times. The reason is that, the user is not a333
random attacker, but an internal user of the system, who spends a long time every day in front of it. We334
assume him as a traitor rather than a masquerader. In repeated games, the actions are called strategies to335
distinguish them from the actions in the stage game.336
SOLUTION OF THE GAME337
In noncooperative game theory, the NE is the most commonly used solution concept. A Nash equilibrium338
of a game is a set of players decisions that results in an outcome, such that, no player has any reason339
to deviate from his choices, given that all the players do the same. John Nash proved that every340
noncooperative game has at least one Nash equilibrium (NE) (45; 30). When no NE exists in pure341
strategies, then there is at least one in mixed strategies. In games with more than one NE, the problem of342
multiple NE and which one to choose appears (48).343
We proceed to solve the game as a three player game. A three player game obviously is more344
complicated than the two player games with a more complex tree. For each round of the game, the tree has345
three different levels. This increases the size of the tree, which makes the solution of the game difficult to346
be located.347
In a three player game, where each player has a limited number of strategies, a matrix can be used.348
The matrix should have three dimensions with the third dimension devoted to the third player strategies.349
In practice, this is easily accomplished with an ’add pages’ technique (20). The first page of the matrix350
depicts the payoffs of the first strategy of the third player. The second page of the matrix depicts the351
payoffs of the second strategy of the third player, etc. Tables 3 and 4 depict the two pages of the matrix352
that describes the GoWiSeN game, which correspond to the two strategies PA might choose, the attacking353
action or the normal action respectively. Each page has two rows for player LIDS’ strategies (suggestion354
for suspicious and suggestion for trusting) and two columns for player GIDS’ strategies (Exclude and355
Admit). The two pages follow one another to represent the same instance. There is a pair of three numbers356
in each cell, which correspond to the payoffs of the PA, the LIDS, and the GIDS respectively.357
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Removing Dominated Strategies358
We first solve the GoWiSeN game by applying the domination criterion, which says that a rational player359
should not use a dominated strategy. Binmore (13) expresses the domination criterion by assuming two360
strategies s1 and s2 of a player I and three strategies t1, t2, and t3 of a player II. Then we decide that for361
player I, strategy s2 strongly dominates strategy s1 when362
π1(s2, t)> π1(s1, t) (2)
for all three values of player II’s strategy t. Moreover, if the relation between two strategies is ≥, then363
the one strategy weakly dominates the other.364
In our game we express in algebraic terms the above criterion to check if it holds. First, we consider365
that player PA chooses an attacking action (Table 3). In this case, given that player GIDS chooses366
Exclude, player LIDS will choose strategy suggestion for suspicious, which dominates suggestion for367
trust, because 24 > 9. Similarly, given that player GIDS chooses Admit, player LIDS will choose again368
strategy suggestion for suspicious, which dominates suggestion for trust too, because 18 > 0.369
PA chooses an attacking action
Global IDS
Exclude Admit
Local IDS Suggestion for
suspicious
0 , 24 , 24 9 , 18 , 0
Suggestion for
trusting
6 , 9 , 12 24 , 0 , 6
Table 3. 1st page of the matrix - Attacking action strategy of PA
PA chooses an normal action
Global IDS
Exclude Admit
Local IDS Suggestion for
suspicious
12 , 6 , 9 18 , 12 , 15
Suggestion for
trusting
15 , 15 , 18 21 , 21 , 21
Table 4. 2nd page of the matrix - Normal action strategy of PA
Using this domination argument, we remove strategy suggestion for trust from the payoff matrix of370
Table 3 and the matrix changes to the following (Table 5):371
PA chooses an attacking action
Global IDS
Exclude Admit
Local IDS Suggestion for
suspicious
0 , 24 , 24 9 , 18 , 0
Table 5. 1st page of the matrix - Attacking action strategy of PA, altered by removing strategy suggestion
for trust
Reversing the above reasoning, we consider that player LIDS chooses suggestion for suspicious. Then,372
player GIDS will choose strategy Exclude, which dominates Admit, because 24 > 0. Similarly, given373
that player LIDS chooses suggestion for trusting, player GIDS will choose again strategy Exclude, which374
dominates Admit too, because 12 > 6.375
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Thus how we reduce the payoff matrix again by removing strategy Admit which is dominated by376
strategy Exclude. The payoff matrix now has the following form (Table 6):377
PA chooses an attacking action
Global IDS
Exclude
Local IDS Suggestion for
suspicious
0 , 24 , 24
Table 6. 1st page of the matrix - Attacking action strategy of PA, altered by removing strategy Admit
Consequently, the above deletions lead to the conclusion that player GIDS will prefer to choose378
strategy Exclude regardless what player LIDS chooses. Another conclusion is that both players, the LIDS379
and the GIDS, have dominant strategies, which is indispensable precondition for three player games380
to have equilibrium. Therefore, in this subgame there is a unique equilibrium, the (attacking action,381
suggestion for suspicious, Exclude) = (0, 24, 24).382
Finally, we examine the above equilibrium, if it is a Nash equilibrium or not. A Nash equilibrium383
must hold that no players have interest to leave the equilibrium and select another strategy. In this three384
player game, we check whether players LIDS and GIDS would choose other strategies than those located385
at the equilibrium. If player LIDS chooses strategy suggestion for suspicious, then player GIDS will386
choose strategy Exclude as the most beneficial (24 > 0). Conversely, if player GIDS chooses strategy387
Exclude, then player LIDS will choose strategy suggestion for suspicious as the most beneficial (24 > 9).388
Obviously, no one between players LIDS and GIDS has any interest to leave the equilibrium (attacking389
action, suggestion for suspicious, Exclude). Therefore, this equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.390
Then, we check if the domination criterion expressed in equation (2) holds, when considering that391
player PA chooses a normal action (Table 4). Following the same reasoning, we conclude that player392
GIDS will prefer to choose strategy Admit regardless what player LIDS chooses. Another conclusion393
is that both players again, the LIDS and the GIDS, have dominant strategies, which is indispensable394
precondition for three player games to have equilibrium. As a result, in this subgame there is a unique395
equilibrium where all players receive 21 each. This equilibrium is very beneficial for player PA, because396
he gets his highest payoff of the game (payoff 21). The equilibrium is the (normal action, suggestion for397
trusting, Admit) = (21, 21, 21).398
We now examine the last equilibrium, if it is a Nash equilibrium or not, in a similar way as we did399
for the first page of the matrix of the game. We check whether players LIDS and GIDS would choose400
other strategies than those located at the equilibrium. If player LIDS chooses strategy suggestion for401
trusting, then player GIDS will choose strategy Admit as the most beneficial (21>18). Conversely, if402
player GIDS chooses strategy Admit, then player LIDS will choose strategy suggestion for trusting as the403
most beneficial (21 > 12). Obviously, no one between players LIDS and GIDS has any interest to leave404
the equilibrium (normal action, suggestion for trusting, Admit). Therefore, this equilibrium is also a Nash405
equilibrium.406
Summarizing, the subgames equilibria located in the GoWiSeN game are two Nash equilibria; the407
(attacking action, suggestion for suspicious, Exclude) = (0, 24, 24) and the (normal action, suggestion for408
trusting, Admit) = (21, 21, 21). Decoding these findings we conclude that both equilibria are absolutely409
desirable for our model architecture described in Section The Architecture of the Model. In a case of the410
first equilibrium, although player PA attacks the network, both IDSs, the Local and the Global detect the411
attack and react properly. In a case of the second equilibrium, player PA behaves as a normal node of the412
network, the LIDS trusts its activity, and the GIDS permits this normal activity to be continued.413
Solving with Gambit414
Computing a Nash equilibrium is a fundamental problem in Algorithmic Game Theory (47). Following415
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou proofs in (19), computing Nash equilibria in a three player game is a416
problem that belongs in the PPAD-complete class, a class defined to address the problem of finding a NE417
in polynomial time. The complexity of computing a NE was consequently addressed in (18) and (52).418
The Gambit tool provides algorithms to compute NE in non-cooperative finite games (2).419
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In Section Removing Dominated Strategies, we located two Nash equilibria in the pure strategies of420
the GoWiSeN game. In order to locate also equilibria in mixed strategies, we use the Gambit tool (42).421
The Gambit tool runs different algorithms. The GoWiSeN is a three player extensive form game. The422
’Compute equilibria of a game using polynomial systems of equations’ algorithm was selected as the most423
suitable, following Gambit’ s documentation (2). The computational complexity of the PPAD class is424
thoroughly discussed in (47).425
Solving the GoWiSeN game in extensive form with the Gambit tool we get one Nash equilibrium.426
This unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies indicates the existence also of a unique equilibrium in427
behavioral strategies. In Figure 3 the solution of the GoWiSeN game reveals the mixed strategies.428
Figure 3. Mixed strategies of the GoWiSeN game located by the Gambit tool.
Numbers below each branch (Zeros, ones, or others) indicate the solution of the game. Zero means429
that an action will not be chosen (probability 0), whereas one means that an action will be selected with430
certainty (probability 1). Likewise, 0.25 for instance is the probability the related action to be chosen.431
Assuming that the GoWiSeN game starts with player PA to have 1/3 probability to be an attacker and 2/3432
probability to be a normal user, the Gambit tool shows that regardless an attacking action or a normal433
action has been chosen, player LIDS will definitely choose suggestion for trusting with probability 1.434
This is because the probability player PA to be a normal user is much higher than to be an attacker.435
As for player GIDS, it excludes with probability 1 an attacking action, for which player LIDS gives436
with zero probability a suggestion for suspicious. This happens because payoffs have been calculated upon437
players’ preferences and thus they reflect their tendencies and first choices, which might totally conflict438
other players’ beliefs. In the same information set that matches the case of a normal user (3:1), player439
GIDS chooses Exclude with probability 1 when player LIDS has suggested suspicious activity. Next, in440
the second information set that matches the case of an attacker (3:2), player GIDS chooses Exclude with441
probability 0.25 or Admit with probability 0.75 regardless whether player LIDS has chosen suggestion for442
suspicious or suggestion for trusting.443
A CASE STUDY444
We have chosen a case study to confirm the functionality of the proposed game applied in fire fighting.445
WSNs can significantly assist the work of fire extinguishing, when they are working securely. Fire fighting446
is one of the most dangerous jobs, often with human victims. The risks associated with it are connected447
with several factors, as for example, the incomplete information about the exact location and the extent448
of a fire. The use of WSNs might reduce the number of risks associated with the firemen, and assist the449
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quick and effective fire extinguishing. Finally, they might give additional information to the experts who450
investigate the cause of a fire, especially in cases where the fire has been caused intentionally.451
Wireless sensor networks for fire fighting452
WSNs can be distinguished between data collection and event detection networks (22). In those applica-453
tions where the aim is the data collection, the sensors might be necessary to collect information every454
short periods at predefined time intervals of the day. As a consequence, for the rest of the time, the sensor455
node remains idle, so it saves power. However, in those cases where a WSN would be used for event456
detection, as it is the fire detection case, the sensor nodes should be alert, consuming continuously their457
power.458
WSNs applied in fire fighting have special requirements that can be summarized as in the follow-459
ing (55):460
• False alarms must be kept to a minimum, because they consume time and resources of the fire461
brigade and thus might lead to unavailability of services in real instances.462
• The WSN should be secure so that malicious activities must be deterred, because they might cause463
false alarms and send false information.464
• As a fire might spread out quickly, the initial node that detects the event must send the data as soon465
as possible. If it fails to do so, then some alerts might not be set and valuable information might be466
lost. Moreover, this initial node must awake other adjacent nodes before destruction.467
• The fire brigade must be connected with the WSN in order to exchange information.468
• The network must be able to reroute its packages in cases of partial destruction, i.e. when specific469
nodes are destroyed, to ensure the uninterruptible operation of the network, Therefore, a feature470
that allows the automatic adjustment of the routing table is required.471
• The data transfer rate should be significantly high in order to keep information valuable and472
accurate.473
• The fire brigade should know the exact positions of the sensor nodes.474
• There must be a visualized demonstration of the location and spread of the fire as well as of the475
temperatures inside the building.476
• The sensor nodes must be properly protected against high temperatures, to ensure their functionality477
and their ability to work accurately.478
Among the described requirements, the proposed game mainly aims at fulfilling the first and the second479
one, by detecting intrusive activities and so reducing the number of false alarms raising by malicious480
nodes.481
The installation of a wireless sensor network in a building482
Consider a WSN installed throughout the rooms of a company’s headquarters in a flat of a skyscraper in483
NY. The whole area extents to 2500 square meters, and numerous small rooms are shaped as offices, using484
special light separators. Figure 4 presents only a division of the area occupied by the company. There are485
small rooms, nodes are scattered densely in each room, and a base station is cited somewhere in a safe486
place of the network’s deployment region. Different types of sensor nodes have been used: temperature487
sensors for detection and tracking, smoke detectors for detection, infrared detectors for tracking and488
smoke and movement detectors too.489
The WSN is always connected with the fire brigade via the internet, so that, it could send an emergency490
signal in case of fire detection. As a result, when fire is detected, the director of the fire brigade will491
be able, via this connection, to send to firemen information related to the initial fire location and to the492
progress and direction of the fire. Moreover, when the firemen arrive at the fire location, they could493
connect to the WSN to receive the latest information about the fire spread. Detailed sketches that depict494
the building infrastructure and the node locations of the WSN will be helpful to the fire brigade.495
Upon arrival, the firemen could use a portable computer in the place of the base station computer. Thus,496
as long as the nodes of the network are properly working, even if the base station has been destructed, the497
WSN will continue its functioning without problems.498
Implementing the GoWiSeN model499
The safety of a WSN applied for fire fighting might be threatened by malicious unauthorized persons500
who try to gain access to the network. Next, such an intruder might intentionally cause a false alarm, or501
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Figure 4. A division of the area covered by the WSN.
even alter information collected from the sensors of the network, affecting the validity and integrity of the502
information being transmitted to the base station.503
The GoWiSeN model has been designed to protect a WSN of similar types of attacks. For this purpose,504
a Local Intrusion Detection System will be installed over each sensor node, named Local IDS. This LIDS505
is a light version of an IDS, with minimum power requirements. Furthermore, the base station will host a506
complete IDS package, named Global IDS (GIDS).507
The GIDS keeps history records for all the events that have been identified as illegal activities of the508
network nodes. Consequently, a list is maintained for each node, rating from 0 to 5 the number of times509
the corresponding node has acted illegally. In particular, the value of 0 indicates a node that operates510
normally and has never been detected for malicious activities, whereas, the value of 5 denotes that the511
node has already been detected 5 times for attacking actions.512
In addition, when a node communicates with other adjacent nodes, because it has a LIDS installed,513
it could examine their activities and preliminary conclude whether a node acts legitimately or not.514
Subsequently, it would send a signal of suggestion for suspicious or a signal of suggestion for trusting to515
the GIDS, depending on its conclusion. Finally, the GIDS on its turn, will decide whether it should admit516
or exclude the node’s activity.517
A fire event is detected when some sensor nodes of the network detect temperatures higher than 40518
°C for a longer period than 10 sec. In case of fire, the LIDS will send a signal of suggestion for trusting519
to the GIDS, if the adjacent nodes report the same information. Under certain circumstances with high520
temperatures due to physical reasons, such as the phenomenon of heatwave during summer, the network521
manager should take care of the limits adjustment.522
The GIDS should then examine three different parameters, in order to decide whether to admit or to523
exclude an activity suggested by a node. First, it should consider the LIDS’s suggestion either for trusting524
or for suspicious. Next, it should take into account the list that corresponds to the node reported the525
problem. As a final point, it might use the detection engine integrated in it, which uses classical detection526
techniques, to verify the initial findings and deduce a definite conclusion.527
Two different scenarios demonstrate the network operation and functioning in the following subsec-528
tions. Scenario A shows in detail the steps for fighting a real fire event, while scenario B presents the529
proposed model functioning, when an attacking activity, originated by a compromised node, takes place.530
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Scenario A531
1. Suppose node N21 is a temperature detection sensor, belongs to cluster C2 and operates normally.532
2. A fire event takes place somewhere inside the area occupied by the company’s headquarters. The533
fire point is next to node N21.534
3. Node N21 detects temperature higher than 40 °C for a longer period than 10 sec, and therefore, an535
alarm is automatically triggered.536
4. The fire event detection is reported to the adjacent nodes.537
5. The adjacent nodes also detect high temperatures according to the predefined thresholds, evaluate538
the received information, and they trigger alarms as well.539
6. Node N21 sends a signal of fire event detection to the base station.540
7. The adjacent nodes’ LIDSs send signals of suggestion for trusting to the base station.541
8. The GIDS puts under consideration all the received information, examines the corresponding list542
with the node ranking, takes into account the adjacent nodes suggestions, and concludes to admit543
the reported event as real.544
9. The base station sends all the collected data to the center of the fire brigade, the fire brigade545
estimates the current situation and counteracts against the fire.546
10. When the operation has been completed, the fire brigade sends information to the GIDS regarding547
the accuracy of the initial information reported the problem.548
Scenario B549
1. Suppose node N21 is a temperature detection sensor, belongs to cluster C2 and operates normally.550
2. A skilled intruder gains access to the WSN, by compromising node N21. His intentions include551
continuous attacks every short time periods. His aim is to set out of order a considerable part of the552
network, each time he completes an attack.553
3. The compromised node N21 initiates an attacking activity. The attack is based on the flooding attack554
technique and will be carried out at the transportation layer of the network. The aim of the flooding555
attack is to exhaust the resources of the adjacent nodes, so that, a part of the network will be set out556
of use.557
4. Each LIDS, that resides on an adjacent node, examines the data captured from this activity. Based558
on this data, the LIDS detects illegal activity, because the number of connection requests, from the559
compromised node N21, is unusually great. Therefore, all the LIDSs of the adjacent nodes will send560
signals of suggestion for suspicious to the base station, considering this activity as an attacking561
activity.562
5. The GIDS puts under consideration all the received information, examines the corresponding list563
with the node ranking, takes into account the adjacent nodes suggestions, and activates the anomaly564
detection technique module to handle the unexpected operation. The module detects that the number565
of requests for connections is over the upper threshold, and the GIDS concludes to exclude the566
requested connections as malicious activities, preventing the network flooding.567
6. The GIDS updates the list assigned to the compromised node, by increasing its ranking by 1. Then568
it checks if the number of times the node has been acted illegally is already 5, and if this is true, the569
GIDS adds the compromised node N21 into a blacklist, for all the routing tables of the network.570
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Applying the GoWiSeN model571
Applying the GoWiSeN model should reveal the way the game described and solved in sections The572
Game and Solution of the Game would be played, in order to protect the WSN established for fire fighting.573
In Scenario A, player PA is a normal user of the system, the user of node N21, which works normally.574
A fire event that takes place very close to this node, triggers an alarm by this node, which also sends575
information to the adjacent nodes. In GoWiSeN, player PA has chosen normal action. Afterwards, the576
adjacent nodes detect the event and evaluate the information received from node N21. Since they conclude577
that the information is valid, they recommend suggestion for trusting to the base station. This means that578
the main LIDS as well the adjacent LIDS will play suggestion for trusting, also because this strategy has579
the highest payoff regardless what the GIDS will choose.580
The base station evaluates all the information collected by the related LIDS and estimates what the581
real situation is. Considering that the ranking of node N21 is low (its value is 0) and taking into account582
what the adjacent nodes recommend, player GIDS chooses Admit. This strategy also gives the best payoff583
to player GIDS, no matter what player LIDS plays. It is the Nash equilibrium located in Section Removing584
Dominated Strategies, (normal action, suggestion for trusting, Admit) = (21, 21, 21).585
In Scenario B, player PA is an internal attacker of the system, the user of node N21, which is586
compromised. We assume that node N21 might work normally most of the times, but sometimes it is587
used by the insider to attack periodically the system. The insider aims at causing unavailability over a588
significant part of the network each time he accomplishes an attack. In such a case, the compromised node589
attacks the system. This means that player PA chooses attacking action. Any adjacent node and its LIDS590
that accepts the attack evaluates this move. The LIDS detects unusual behavior, because the compromised591
node suddenly starts sending a large number of connection requests. Player LIDS will choose suggestion592
for suspicious and will send the relevant information to the base station. Nevertheless, this strategy has593
the highest payoff.594
In the base station, the GIDS examines the event and chooses Exclude preventing its completion. This595
decision is based also upon an anomaly detection technique which detects the unusual behavior of the596
aforementioned node, the history and the list with the rankings and updates the corresponding ranking for597
the compromised node N21 by adding 1. If the node ranking will be 5, then it becomes blacklisted for598
all the routing tables of the network. In this case, player GIDS will play Exclude regardless what player599
LIDS chooses. It is the Nash equilibrium located in Section Removing Dominated Strategies, (attacking600
action, suggestion for suspicious, Exclude) = (0, 24, 24).601
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS602
After completing the theoretical analysis as presented in the previous sections, we decided to conduct603
simulations on realistic datasets using IDSs with different capabilities.604
Dataset605
We use a recent dataset that was collected from a realistic network environment, namely the Bot-IoT606
dataset (Dat) for the experiments. Table 7 summarizes the statistics of attacks in Training and Testing607
datasets. Both datasets satisfies the eleven indispensable characteristics of a valid IDS dataset, namely608
Anonymity, Attack Diversity, Complete Capture, Complete Interaction, Complete Network Configuration,609
Available Protocols, Complete Traffic, Feature Set, Metadata, Heterogeneity, and Labelling (25). Table 8610
gives a synopsis of the main simulation parameters that affect the experimental evaluations.611
The BoT-IoT dataset contains more than 72.000.000 records devised on 74 files, each row having 46612
features. We use the version proposed by Koroniotis et al. (35), which is a version of training and testing613
with 5% of the entire dataset.614
Clustering and classification techniques615
Assuming that the architecture described in Figure 1 consists of IDSs of different capabilities due to616
power, storage and computational constraints, we decided to evaluate the performance of different IDSs617
on Bot-IoT dataset.618
IDS performance is evaluated based on its capability of classifying network traffic into a correct type.619
Table 9, also known as confusion matrix, shows all the possible cases of classification.620
We decided to use an IDS with poor performance to play the role of the LIDS and a classifier with621
very good performance as the GIDS. This is due to the fact that each simple node can play the role622
16/24
Category Attack Type Flow Count Training Test
BENIGN BENIGN 9543 7634 1909
Information gathering Service scanning 1463364 117069 29267
OS Fingerprinting 358275 28662 7166
DDoS attack DDoS TCP 19547603 1563808 390952
DDoS UDP 18965106 1517208 379302
DDoS HTTP 19771 1582 395
DoS attack DoS TCP 12315997 985280 246320
DoS UDP 20659491 1652759 413190
DoS HTTP 29706 2376 594
Information
theft Keylogging 1469 1175 294
Data theft 118 94 24
Total / 73370443 5877647 1469413
Table 7. Attack Types in Bot-IoT dataset
Number of Players 3
Number of Nodes [Bot-IoT dataset] 8
Mean Simulation Time [Training & Testing] 1220[KMeans], 760[Naive Bayes]
Actions Alarm - Exclude \Admit
Table 8. Simulation parameters
of LIDS and we cannot expect it to have high computation or energy capabilities and this we need to623
have a simple method running on it. On the same time GIDS is a specific node that can have additional624
capabilities. For LIDS we have used Kmeans clustering and for the GIDS the Naive Bayes method. The625
overall performance of both methods is presented in Table 10.626
The aforementioned values correspond to the different arcs in the tree that is presented in Figure 3.627
The pairing of each value of the IDS and the arcs on the tree is represented in Figure 5. Based on this628
pairing, we changed the payoff of each player for every strategy, by assigning the payoff proportion, which629
corresponds to the probability a strategy profile being selected, as shown in Table 11. These probabilities630
derive from the detection rates provided by the dataset, and complies with the game theoretic solution631
approach followed to locate NE in mixed strategies (13). Based on these calculations, the payoffs that632
incorporate the performance of the IDSs are inserted into the model, as shown in Figure 5.633
We solve again the model with the Gambit tool (42) and we get one Nash equilibrium. This unique634
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies indicates the existence also of a unique equilibrium in behavioral635
strategies. In Figure 6 the solution of the GoWiSeN game reveals the mixed strategies.636
Numbers below each branch (Zeros, ones, or others) indicate the solution of the game. Zero means637
that an action will not be chosen (probability 0), whereas one means that an action will be selected with638
certainty (probability 1). Likewise, 0.20 for instance is the probability the related action to be chosen. By639
incorporating the evaluation metrics of the IDSs, we see that the probabilities in each branch has changed,640
representing a more realistic scenario, without deterministic decisions that dominated the previous model.641
We can observe that GIDS takes a on/off decision following the decision of the LIDS. LIDS on the other642
hand has probability 0.2 to fire an alarm and 0.8 to accept the bahavior of the node as normal, regardless643
of the action of the PA.644
SPECIAL CASES645
Except from the general case where one PA is performing in a malicious way and the LIDS is detecting646
this, there are some special cases that need to be modeled in a different way. These two special cases are647




Actual class Negative Class True negative (TN) False positive (FP)
Positive Class False negative (FN) True positive (TP)
Table 9. Confusion matrix
Method True Positive (TP) False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP)
Naive Bayes 0.999972 0.000028 0.975 0.025
Kmeans 0.55 0.45 0.916 0.084
Table 10. Evaluation of different IDSs
Overlapping clusters649
In WSNs clustering is an efficient approach used to achieve optimal performance of the network. In tradi-650
tional clustering methods disjoint clusters are created, using some specific criteria that include distance,651
energy, delay etc. On the other hand, many scholars have highlighted the significant advantages of creating652
overlapping clusters when applying intercluster routing, node localization, and time synchronization653
protocols (65; 40; 3).654
In this case, several PAs belong to two clusters and thus are monitored by two LIDSs as represented655
in Figure 7. In order to model this situation we need to construct different games. In Figure 8, we can see656
the representation of a game that consists of the PA, that belongs to clusters A and B, and LIDSa of cluster657
A (left part of the figure). On the right part of the figure, in case these two IDSs perform the same, thus658
having the same TP, TN, FP, TN, these two short trees can be merged creating the same outcome as the659
normal case. In the occasion that these IDSs have different performance due to running different detection660
algorithms, or due to other parameters that affect the observation capabilities (distance, interference or661
even trust levels) these two trees cannot be merged, and the outcomes of the two LIDSs must be combined662
using smart techniques (39).663
LIDS under attack664
During the analysis and evaluation of the system we have assumed that the LIDSs are immune to cyber665
attacks. This assumption is not very realistic since any node can play the role of a LIDS. In the specific666
case where a LIDS is infected, the GIDS can detect the attack and report back to the system, in order to667
ignore its alarms and also appoint another node as LIDS for the cluster. The reappointment of the LIDS668
can be done similar to a reclustering procedure, where nodes, through voting, elect the node that will play669
this role for their cluster (10).670
For this special case, the model that can be constructed consists of only two players, the LIDS (that671
plays the role of the PA) and the GIDS (that plays the role of the LIDS). Such a model is represented in672
Figure 9 and can be solved in a similar way as the general case, but with fewer players and less states.673
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK674
The incorporation of a game theoretic approach in the area of Intrusion Detection to confront internal675
attackers in WSNs was selected. To address the problem of detecting compromised nodes, a three player676
non-cooperative game was modeled, between Local IDSs located on different sensor nodes (LIDSs), a677
Global IDS (GIDS) and an insider. Possible interactions between an insider and Intrusion Detection678
Systems used in a WSN were examined, and possible suggesting strategies were studied through the679
solution of the game, by locating Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies. The evaluation of the model using a680
realistic dataset from a network environment was decided, to challenge its ability to discriminate between681
normal and malicious nodes. In special cases, nodes that belong to overlapping clusters were considered682
and the corresponding model was studied. Finally, the situation where a LIDS is compromised was683
examined and different solution approaches to this problem too were discussed. The results show how the684
game should be played, what the players choose to play and under which circumstances. An ultimate goal685
is the identification of a node as compromised and its exclusion of the network to prevent further damage.686
The integration of the evaluation metrics of LIDSs and GIDS through the use of a realistic dataset687
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State LIDS GIDS LIDS initial GIDS initial LIDS final GIDS final
performance performance reward reward reward reward
TP - TP 0.55 0.999972 24 24 13.2 5 23.999328
TP - FN 0.55 0.000028 18 0 9.9 0
FN - TP 0.45 0.999972 9 12 4.05 11.999664
FN - FN 0.45 0.000028 0 6 0 0.000168
FP - FP 0.084 0.025 6 9 0.504 0.225
FP - TN 0.084 0.975 12 15 1.008 14.625
TN - FP 0.916 0.025 15 18 13.74 0.45
TN - TN 0.916 0.975 21 21 19.236 20.475
Table 11. Recalculated rewards for each player
Figure 5. Integrating performance of IDSs in mixed strategies.
further improves the efficiency of the proposed model. The use of different datasets, combination of more688
machine learning techniques and the use of smart ensemble methods can be considered as future research689
paths. Regarding a future extension of the theoretical game model, subgame perfect equilibria will be690
considered to improve collaboration between LIDSs and GIDS as well as different preference rankings691
that correspond to miscellaneous types of insiders.692
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